Economic stability and progress in modern technological societies depend on vigorous and independent public funding of science and engineering research. When peer review or funding decisions are perceived as politically directed, scientists, funding agencies, and the public react in coupled and conflicting ways. We describe an evolutionary game-theoretic model to analyze how perceived political interference in science funding affects the interrelated behaviors of scientists, funding agencies, and the public. The model simulates scientists choosing to refuse peer reviews and retaliate, agencies responding by adopting AI-assisted review and altering reviewer pay, and the public accepting or rejecting these AI systems. Through numerical simulations, five principal findings are identified: (1) Operational capacity and institutional legitimacy are governed by separate conditions and can fail independently. (2) Legitimacy of the process is bistable, meaning final states are determined by the public’s acceptance of AI. (3) Since the career cost for researchers refusing to review is generally low, resistance/retaliation cascades can readily ignite, leading identical institutions to entirely opposite fates. (4) Increasing reviewer pay only stabilizes participation within a strict budget-solvency frontier, and emergency pay can paradoxically erode the legitimacy it aims to protect. (5) Finally, finite-population simulations reveal that baseline scenarios partition into either legitimacy recovery without capacity or joint failure, confirming that the fundamental separation of capacity and legitimacy outcomes is a dominant structural feature driven primarily by initial scientific resistance and politicization levels. This theoretical work quantifies issues for future work in science policy.
Significance
Modern industrial nations rely on public funding of science, certified through expert peer reviews whose authority rest as much on perceived institutional independence as on processing capacity. We model what happens when review or funding decisions are seen as politically directed, and artificial intelligence (AI) substitutes for resistant human reviewers. Treating scientists, the public, and an adaptive funding agency as interacting populations, the model shows that operational capacity and institutional legitimacy obey separate dynamics and can fail independently: automation can sustain a review pipeline while its authority collapses, or legitimacy can recover while backlogs persist. Under finite populations, identical institutions can reach markedly different fates by chance alone, and how often chance favors survival depends on the noise process assumed, not on a fixed institutional probability. This framework identifies which conditions govern whether resistance ignites or whether legitimacy, once threatened, is repaired, as explicit future priorities for empirical calibration and policy design.
Lay Abstract
Modern societies depend on public funding for scientific research, a system that only functions if the public believes the process is fair. Using evolutionary game theory, this mathematical work explores what happens when scientific peer review is viewed as politically compromised, and funding agencies turn to artificial intelligence (AI) to replace human experts who protest the system.
The mathematical model reveals several critical warnings for policymakers:
Automation Does Not Equal Trust: Keeping grant money flowing and maintaining public trust are two separate problems. An agency can successfully use AI to process grants while the public completely loses faith in its decisions, creating a “zombie” institution.
The Threat of “Proposal Flooding”: When scientists protest, in principle they refuse to undertake peer review, and can overwhelm the funding agency by submitting many proposals. This retaliatory flooding and refusal to review, within a limited budget, can outpace any AI system’s ability to keep up, causing the entire pipeline to collapse.
Emergency Pay Can Backfire: Trying to secure scientists’ cooperation by raising reviewer pay during a highly politicized crisis can make things worse, as the public may view this emergency pay as a “bribe,” which rapidly destroys whatever institutional trust remains.
Early Action is Critical: Human behavior is unpredictable, small early differences in how people react can push identical institutions toward completely different fates. This model tracks individual scientists and members of the public to capture their behavior, which appears to be model-dependent, thus producing sensitivity to early demographic fluctuations and chance factors. Under the standard assumption, every simulated agency ended up with an unmanageable backlog; the only thing chance decided was whether public trust recovered. Under a coarser and more commonly used shortcut, roughly half the agencies appeared to recover fully, and a “zombie” agency that kept processing grants while trust collapsed appeared in about one in six. Policymakers therefore must urgently focus on building trust through transparent, explainable AI rollouts before public rejection becomes permanent.