Rédiger un PREreview

Advances in biological research can produce powerful insights with broad public benefits – but can also generate information that, if misused, poses serious biosecurity risks. Yet institutions lack clear, actionable guidance on how to assess and respond to such risks without stifling innovation or scientific discovery.In response, the Meselson Center at RAND has developed a living framework and toolkit to support responsible decisions about the disclosure of potentially hazardous biosecurity information. This framework is grounded in the principle that researchers and institutions must balance the societal benefits of open science with the real and growing risks of misuse of potentially dangerous information. It also provides a structured process for identifying when and how to pause, limit, or modify the release of sensitive research findings. Importantly, the framework is designed to be simple, transparent, actionable, improvable, and repeatable – capable of evolving as technologies change and our understanding of risk matures.For this working paper, we used a conceptual framing to systematically explore the trade-offs in biosecurity information disclosure, enabling us to identify the key questions that should guide decision-making. To do this, we reviewed published academic work, government and independent research organization reports, and working papers posted on open science repositories. This was followed by engagement with RAND experts with expertise in biology, artificial intelligence, information security, risk analysis, security analysis, and red teaming to answer the following questions:· How should the Meselson Center decide whether to publish potentially hazardous information that it generates through biosecurity research efforts?· What key factors and incentives that shape strategies for managing biosecurity information hazards?This project aimed to make our understanding of the tradeoffs between disclosure and non-disclosure significantly more concrete and produce a set of non-exhaustive mitigation actions. Ultimately, this framework is intended to be a living document, evolving as science, policy, and threats change. It aims to reduce biosecurity risks without stifling scientific inquiry, providing a robust and adaptable model that other institutions can build on when seeking to manage theinformation hazard dilemma in a rapidly advancing research landscape. By embedding oversight, promoting transparency, and grounding evaluations in a structured methodology, the framework and toolkit provides a foundation for making difficult disclosure decisions in a principled and practical way.